DALBIR SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave against the decision of the High Court of Punjab raises for consideration principally the constitutional validity of S. 3 of the Pepsu Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act (Act 1 of 1953) which will be referred to hereafter as the impugned Act.

(2.) The four appellants were at one time members of the Pepsu Police force and were charged, before the First Class Magistrate at Faridkot, with having committed three offences: (1) under S. 26 of the Pepsu Police Safety Ordinance (No.7 of Samvat 2006), (2) under S. 33 of the said Ordinance, and (3) under S. 3 of the impugned Act. We shall be referring to the provisions of the relevant enactments in due course. The accused pleaded not guilty and were tried by the learned Magistrate who by his judgment dated August 28,1958, held the prosecution case fully established against all the accused. He convicted the four appellants under S. 26 of the Public Safety Ordinance and sentenced them to imprisonment for six months. The third appellant alone was convicted of the offence under S. 33 of the same Ordinance and was sentenced to imprisonment for six months. Appellants 1, 2 and 4 were further convicted of offences under S. 3 of the impugned Act and sentenced to imprisonment for six months, the several sentences against the respective accused being directed to run concurrently. The appellants filed an appeal to the Sessions Judge at Bhatinda who upheld the convictions but reduced the sentences. In respect of the offence under S.26 of the Public Safety Ordinance the sentence passed against the four appellants was reduced to imprisonment for three months while in respect of the third accused who had been additionally sentenced under S. 33 of the Ordinance, the same was reduced to imprisonment for 1 1/2 month and the sentences on appellants 1, 2 and 4 under S. 3 of the impugned Act was reduced to imprisonment for three months, the sentences again being directed to run concurrently. With these modifications the appeals stood dismissed. The appellants thereafter preferred a revision to the High Court and this was heard by a learned Single Judge who while accepting the revision of the appellants in so far as it related to their conviction and sentence under S. 26 of the Ordinance, maintained the other convictions and sentences but reduced the sentences. It is from this judgment of the High Court that this appeal has been preferred by the four appellants.

(3.) It would be seen from the above narrative that the appeal is concerned with the propriety of the conviction of appellants 1, 2 and 4 of an offence under S. 3 of the impugned Act and of the third appellant under S. 33 of the Ordinance, all the appellants having been acquitted by the High Court of the charge against them under S. 26 of the Ordinance. It is therefore not necessary to refer to the terms of S. 26 or the offence constituted by it. In the Courts below including the High Court no challenge was made as regards the legality of any of the provisions of law of the violation of which the appellants were found guilty but before us though learned Counsel did not raise any contention regarding the validity of S. 33 of the Pepsu Public Safety Ordinance, challenged the constitutionality of S. 3 of the impugned Pepsu Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act which appellants 1, 2 and 4 were found to have violated and for which they were sentenced to a term of imprisonment.