LAWS(SC)-1962-8-10

V RAMACHANDRA AYYAR Vs. RAMALINGAM CHETTIAR

Decided On August 10, 1962
V.RAMACHANDRA AYYAR Appellant
V/S
RAMALINGAM CHETTIAR Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave raises the old familiar question about the limits of the High Court's jurisdiction to interfere with findings of fact in a Second Appeal under S. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Defendants 1 and 2 who are the appellants before us contend that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in interfering with the findings of fact recorded by the lower appellate Court in their favour in dismissing the suit filed against them by respondent No. 1. Before dealing with this question, it is necessary to refer to the material facts leading to the present dispute between the parties.

(2.) It appears that there was a partnership between appellant No. 1 Ramachandra Iyer, his father-in-law V. Kuppuswami Ayyar who was the father of appellant No. 2 Vanchinatha Ayyar, Rama Ayyar and Lakshmanan Chettiar. This partnership worked two mills in Kasba Chidambaram. Lakshmanan Chettiar is the father of respondent No. 1, the plaintiff, and respondent No. 2, defendant No. 3. After the death of V. V. Kuppuswami Ayyar the second appellant took his place in the partnership. Rama Ayyar retired from the partnership in September, 1936. Lakshmanan Chettiar died on the 10th June, 1936, so that after the retirement of Rama Ayyar the partnership continued to be managed by the two appellants as partners. On the 26th September, 1938, defendant No. 3 executed a release deed in favour of the two appellants. Under this document, Rs.9,165 were agreed to be paid by the appellants in lieu of the amount due to the share of Lakshmanan Chettiar. Out of this amount, Rs. 8,165 were paid to respondent No. 2 on the date when the document was executed and Rs. 1,000 were kept with the appellants in order to be paid to respondent No. 1 who is the present plaintiff, on his attaining majority. Respondent No. 2 had attained majority on August 12, 1938, whereas respondent No. 1 attained majority on January 17, 1947. It appears that on June 30, 1944, the balance of Rs. 1,000 which was kept with the appellants to be paid to respondent No. 1 on his attaining majority, was paid by them to respondent No. 2 on his furnishing security. After respondent No. 1 attained majority, he gave notice to the appellants calling upon them to satisfy him about the correctness and bona fide character of the transaction of settlement reached between them and his brother, respondent No. 2, and in that connection, he demanded an inspection of the relevant books of account. The appellants turned down his request for the inspection of the account-books and so, on January 9, 1950, i.e., within three years after his attaining majority, respondent No. 1 filed the present suit.

(3.) In his suit, respondent No. 1 alleged that at the time when his elder brother, respondent No. 2, executed a release deed in favour of the appellants, he (respondent No. 2) had just attained majority and at the time of the said transaction, he had no independent advice and was literally imposed upon. " The plaint further alleged that the said release deed was executed for a wholly inadequate consideration, without full knowledge by the second respondent of the real facts of the situation and only as a provisional arrangement. According to respondent No.1, the arrangement was no more than tentative and it was not binding against him. It is mainly on these allegations that he alleged that the release deed could not have "validly bartered away his share in the profits due to his deceased father as a partner of the firm" and he claimed a declaration that the said release deed was not binding on him; that he was entitled to have an account rendered by the appellants in regard to the profits and assets of the partnership as on June 10, 1936, the date on which his father died, and that the share allotted to his father should be ascertained and the appellants directed to Pay him 1/2 of the same. In the plaint, respondent No. 1 also claimed that he was entitled to recover a share of the profits of the two mills up to the date of the suit, proportionate to the sum found due to him.