S S GREWAL Vs. BHOWRA KANKANEE COLLIERIES LIMITED

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal by special leave against the judgment of the Patna High Court. The brief facts necessary for present purposes are these. There is a colliery in the district of Dhanbad known as Amlabad colliery of which the respondents are the owners. On February 5, 1955 there was an accident in the colliery as a result of which 52 persons lost their lives. In consequence, the Government of India ordered an inquiry into the disaster under S. 24 of the Mines Act, No. 35 of 1952 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The Court of Inquiry consisted of Mr. Justice B. P. Jamuar and two persons were appointed to assist him as assessors. The Court of Inquiry submitted its report on September 26, 1955, which was published on December 17, 1955. A question was raised before the Court of Inquiry whether the management should be ordered to pay the expenses of the inquiry as provided by R. 22 of the Mines Rules, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), which lays down that

(2.) On July 27, 1956, the Chief Inspector of Mines requested Mr. Justice Jamuar that the amount of expenses should be specified and the manner in which it should be paid and the time within it should be which the payment might be made, might be fixed. Notices were issued to the parties concerned thereafter and on September 7, 1956, Mr. Justice Jamuar ordered the owners to pay Rupees 17,778-2-0 as expenses of the inquiry within two months of the date of the order. Thereupon a petition was filed under Art. 226 of the Constitution by the respondents challenging the order of September 7, 1956. It was conceded therein that R. 22 of the Rules conferred power on the Court of Inquiry to direct the owner to pay all or any part of the expenses of inquiry within such time as the Court may specify. But the order passed in this case was challenged on three grounds, firstly that the Court of Inquiry became functus officio after it had submitted its report on September 26, 1955, and, therefore, Mr. Justice Jamuar had no power left to pass the order of September 7, 1956. It was also contended that if the order of September 7, 1956, be treated as a review of the order of September 26, 1955, it would still be void, as there was no power of review in the Court of Inquiry. Lastly it was urged that when the order of September 7, 1956 was passed, the two assessors were not present and were not associated with the inquiry and, therefore, Mr. Justice Jamuar could not pass the order alone. All these three contentions were accepted by the High Court and it allowed the writ petition adding that it was not interfering with the order relating to expenses made by Mr. Justice Jamuar in this report of September 26, 1955. It is this order of the High Court, which is being challenged before us.

(3.) The main contention on behalf of the respondents is that as the Court of Inquiry became functus officio after the report of September 26, 1955, it was not open to Mr. Justice Jamuar to quantify the expenses by the order of September 7, 1956. Before we deal with this main argument we should like to dispose of briefly the other two submissions made before the High Court which were also accepted by it. The first of these contentions is that the order of September 7, 1956, is an order of review and as there is no power of review granted to the Court of Inquiry, Mr. Justice Jamuar had no power to pass that order. It is enough to say that the order of September 7, 1956 cannot be called an order of review. We have already pointed out that the order that the owners should pay the expenses of the inquiry was already incorporated in the report of September 26, 1955, though it was not qualified. All that the order of September 7, 1956, has done is to quantify the amount of expenses. Therefore, this order cannot be treated as a review or any variation of the order passed in the report of September 26, 1955. It would have been a different matter if no order as to the payment of expenses had been made in the report of September 26, 1955. In that case it may have been possible for the respondents to argue that the later order was an order reviewing the failure to pass an order as to expenses in the report. But when the report itself contained the order for payment of expenses, the later order is merely a quantification of that order and would be on a part with what happens every day in Courts which pass decrees with costs. When giving judgment, Courts do not quantify costs in the judgment. This qualification is done later in the office of the Court and if there is any dispute about it the Court settles that dispute and then includes the costs in the decree or final order. What has happened in the present case is something similar and the order of Mr. Justice Jamuar, dated September 7, 1956, cannot in the circumstances be called an order of review which he had no power to pass. The contention, therefore, under this head must fail.