(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order of the Punjab High Court, dated October 6,1960, dismissing Letters Patent Appeal from the judgment of a single Judge of that Court, dated September 10, 1957, dismissing the appellant's writ petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution. There are two respondents, namely, (1) the Union of India and (2) Director- General, Posts and Telegraphs, New Delhi.
(2.) This case had a checkered history as will appear from the following facts. The appellant was appointed in June 1943 as an Engineering Supervisor by the second respondent. In January 1949, he was suspended from service on account of certain activities of his which were considered to be objectionable. He was duly served with a notice to show cause, and his case was in due course considered by the Committee of Advisers, who recommended that he be retained in service. In pursuance of the recommendation of the Advisory Committee, the appellant was reinstated with effect from May 26, 1951. After passing his departmental examination in 1952, the appellant was appointed as officiating Sub-Divisional Officer, Telegraphs. While he was so employed at Nagpur, he was served with a notice dated November 3, 1952, from the office of the Director-General, Posts and Telegraphs, under the provisions of Rr. 3 and 4 of Civil Services (Safeguarding of National Security) Rules, 1949 which hereinafter will be referred to as the Rules in the following terms:
(3.) The appellant moved the erstwhile High Court of Judicature at Nagpur under Art. 226 of the Constitution. The case was heard by a Full Bench of three Judges consisting of Kaushalendra Rao, V. R. Sen and Bhutt, JJ. The Court was agreed as to the order to be passed, namely, that the petition should be dismissed on the ground that no writ could issue against the respondents, though the Judges were not agreed on the merits of the controversy Kaushalendra Rao, J. was of the view that even on merits the Court could not grant any relief, whereas Sen and Bhutt, JJ., took the view that it was not covered by Art. 310 of the Constitution, and that the allegations in the initial show-cause notice were vague, nor did they disclose any personal association on the part of the appellant in any subversive activities, and that, therefore, there was no compliance with R. 4 of the Rules.