KIRLOSKAR OIL ENGINES Vs. HANMANT LAXMAN BIBAWE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent Bibawe made an application to the Industrial Tribunal at Bombay under s. 33-A of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. He alleged that he had been employed by the appellant M/s. Kirloskar Oil Engines, Limited, as a watchman since July 21, 1958, and that he had been working as such watchman with the appellant and had become its permanent workman. On May 15, 1960, the Security Officer of the appellant Company initiated to him that he had been discharged from service with effect from that date. The respondent urged that at the time when this order of discharge was orally served on him, an industrial dispute was pending between the appellant and its employees before an Industrial Tribunal and as such the respondent could not be discharged by the appellant without obtaining the approval of the Industrial Tribunal. In other words, his case was that his discharge was in contravention of the provisions of s. 33 and that is the basis of his application under s. 33-A.

(2.) The appellant denied that the respondent was its employee. It pleaded that the respondents services had been made available to the appellant by an arrangement, the terms of which clearly indicated that even whilst the respondent was working as a watchman of the appellant, he was not the employee of the appellant in the legal sense. That being so, it was argued that s. 33 was not contravened and the application under s. 33-A was incompetent.

(3.) It would thus be seen that the narrow point of dispute between the parities before the Tribunal was whether or not the respondent was the appellants employee and as such could be said to be a workman concerned in the dispute which was pending industrial adjudication at the time of his discharge. The Tribunal set forth the rival contention of the parties on this point and observed that it could not accept either of the extreme contentions taken by both the sides; even so in substance the Tribunal seems to have taken the view that s. 33 had been contravened by the appellant and so an order has been passed directing the appellant to reinstate the respondent with full back wages from the date of his discharge. It is against this order that the appellant has come to this Court by special leave.