STRAW BOARD MANUFACTURING CO LIMITED SAHARANPUR Vs. GOVIND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave raises the question of interpretation of S. 6-E (2) (b) of the United Provinces Industrial Disputes Act, U. P. Act No. XXVIII of 1947, (hereinafter called the U. P. Act) which is in exactly the same terms as S. 33 (2) (b) of the Industrial. Disputes Act, No. XIV of 1947, (hereinafter referred to as the Act) as amended by Act 36 of 1956. The question arises in this way. The appellant is a Strawboard Mill. The respondent was in the employ of the appellant. On August 12, 1959, the respondent was given certain orders by the Technical Director of the appellant, but he refused to comply with them. The same day the respondent refused to comply with certain similar orders given by the machineman. Again on August 13,1959, he refused to obey similar orders of the shift-incharge. Finally, on August 14, he refused to obey similar orders of another shift-incharge. Consequently a notice was served on the respondent to show cause why he should not be dealt with under Cl. 22 (a) of the Standing Orders which provided that wilful insubordination or disobedience of any lawful orders of superior was misconduct. The respondent submitted his explanation. He was then suspended and a chargesheet was served on him on 16-8-59. Thereafter an inquiry was held into the alleged misconduct. After the inquiry was over the appellant referred the matter for the decision of the Labour Commissioner without giving any prior decision of its own as provided in cl. 30 of the Standing Orders. The Labour Commissioner, however, refused to give a decision and informed the appellant that it could take such action as it was entitled to under the Standing Orders. The appellant again approached the Labour Commissioner for giving an order as envisaged by Cl. 30 of the Standing Orders, but the Labour Commissioner finally refused to pass any order and directed the appellant to take such action as it thought fit and as was within its power. Thereupon the appellant dismissed the respondent on February 1, 1960. As however, two disputes were pending between the appellant and its workmen one before the Industrial Tribunal No. 8 at Allahabad and the other before the Labour Court at Meerut, the appellant sent applications by lost on the same day to the two authorities or approval of the action taken, namely, the dismissal of the respondent. It appeals that the tribunal at Allahabad approve of the action on March 22, 1960. When however the same matter came before the labour court at Meerut on April 29, 1960, it refused to approve the action taken, even though the order passed by the tribunal at Allahabad already was brought to its notice. The labour court at Meerut held that the appellant was not motivated by victimisation. It further held that in the inquiry held by the appellant, a prima facie case had been made out for the dismissal of the respondent; but the labour court said that though ordinary the application of the appellant shout have been granted in these circumstances it refused to approve the dismissal on the ground that the application for approval had been made after the respondent had already been dismissed; therefore it held that the application was not bona fide and in the circumstances the prayer that the order of dismissal should be approved was not granted. It was of the view that the proviso to S. 6E (2) (b) required that the application for approval should be made before the dismissal of the workman concerned and failure to do so amounted to contravention of the terms of the section. Therefore as the application in this case was made after the dismissal, approval could not be granted and on this narrow ground the labour court refused to approve of the dismissal of the respondent. Thereupon the respondent obtained special leave from this court and that is how the matter has come up before us.

(2.) The question thus raised depends upon the interpretation of the terms of Section 6E (2) which as we have said already correspond word for word with the provisions of S. 33 (2) of the Act. We shall therefore set out the provisions of S. 33 (2) which reads as below:-

(3.) Before however we turn to the interpretation of the proviso we may refer to the circumstances in which S. 33 (2) came to be enacted. Originally there was no such provision like S. 33 (2) in the Act and the only provision to be found therein corresponded to the present S. 33 (1). The object behind enacting S. 33 as it was before the amendment of 1956 was to allow continuance of industrial proceedings pending before any authority prescribed by the Act in a calm and peaceful atmosphere undisturbed by any other industrial disputed. The plain object of the section was to maintain the status quo as far as possible during the pendency of any industrial dispute before a tribunal. But it seems to have been felt that S. 33, as it stood before the amendment of 1956, was too stringent for it completely took away the right of the employer to make any alteration in the conditions of service or to make any order of discharge or dismissal without making any distinction as to whether such alteration or such an order of discharge or dismissal was in any manner connected with the dispute pending before an industrial authority. It seems to have been felt therefore that the stringency of the provision should be softened and the employer should be permitted to make changes in conditions of service etc. which were not connected with the dispute pending before an industrial tribunal. For the same reason it was felt that the authority of the employer to dismiss or discharge a workman should not be completely taken away where the dismissal or discharge was dependent on matters unconnected with the dispute pending before any tribunal. At the same time it seems to have been felt that some safeguards should be provided for a workman who may be discharged or dismissed during the pendency of a dispute on account of some matter unconnected with the dispute. Consequently S . 33 was redrafted in 1956 and considerably expanded. It is now in five sub-sections while before 1956 it consisted practically of what is now sub-s. (1).