(1.) Special leave is granted.
(2.) The appellant, Havildar Ratan Singh was tried and convicted by Summary Court Martial. He was reduced in rank and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. He filed an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before the Delhi High Court, which was dismissed by the impugned judgment.
(3.) Although a number of questions were raised in the writ petition and the special leave petition, the ground urged by the learned counsel for the appellant before us is confined to one point. It has been contended that having regard to the nature of the charge against the appellant, the provisions of Section 34 of the Army Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) are attracted, and in view of Section 120(2) of the Act, trial by summary not permitted.The learned counsel has placed the relevant provisions of the Act indicating that the appellant would have been entitled to a qualitatively better right of defence before a court martial other than a summary court martial, which was denied to him on a wrong assumption that the case was covered by Section 36, and not by Section 34. The question, which arises in this case, is whether the Summary Court Martial had jurisdiction to try the appellant in the facts as alleged in the present case.