STATE OF TAMIL NADU Vs. A MUHAMMEDYOUSEF

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondents have successfully challenged a notification under S. 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 oposing to acquire their land before the Madras High Court. Their writ petition was allowed by a learned Single Judge and on appeal the order was confirmed by Division Bench. The State of Tamil Nadu has challenged the decision by the present Special Leave Petition.

(2.) The acquisition proceeding, which is the subject matter of present case, was started for obtaining land for construction of houses by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board, constituted under S. 3 of the Madras State Housing Board Act, 1961 (Madras Act No. 17 of 1961) (hereinafter referred to as the 'Housing Board Act'), and this was mentioned in the impugned notification. The High Court has held that the public purpose mentioned in the notification was too vague in absence of details relating to the scheme for which the acquisition is sought to be made, and consequently the land owners cannot effectively avail of the benefits under S. 5A of the Land Acquisition Act by filing their objection. The learned Attorney-General, appearing for the petitioner State, has contended that the notification has adequately described the nature of the public purpose by mentioning the proposed construction of residential buildings, and the respondents ought to have filed their objections under S. 5A instead of moving the High Court with a writ application. Relying on the decision in Babu Barkys Thakur v. State of Bombay, (1961) 1 SCR 128 , it has been argued that even assuming that the public purpose was not mentioned in the notification with sufficient particularity, the proceeding cannot be quashed at this stage and the High Court should have dismissed the writ petition by pointing out that the remedy of the land owners was under S. 5A.

(3.) The reply of Mr. Parasaran, the learned counsel for the respondents, is that in view of the provisions of the Housing Board Act a proceeding for land acquisition can be commenced only after a scheme under the Act is framed, which has not been done in the present case. The land acquisition proceeding, therefore, being premature has been rightly quashed.