KALIMATA THAKURANI AND RAGHUNATH JEW ISHWAR DHARMARAJ THAKUR SHASHANKASEKHAR JANA SIB KUMAR BANERJEE SITALAMATA THAKURANI NARYANA CHANDRA SINGHA Vs. UNION OF INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution have been filed in order to challenge the vires of the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the '1955 Act') as also various amendments made to the said Act up to 1977. The first plank of argument related to the constitutional validity of the 1955 Act. The second plank of argument was confined to the validity of the West Bengal Land Reforms (Amendment) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Amendment Act of 1972') which was in the nature of a Ceiling Act prescribing a particular ceiling of the area of land which could be retained by the tenant. So far as the Ceiling Act, viz., the Amendment Act of 1972 is concerned, it is conceded by the counsel for the petitioners that the constitutional validity of the aforesaid Act is clearly concluded by a recent decision of this Court in Waman Rao v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 271, where a Constitution Bench of this Court rejected the various grounds of challenge in respect of the constitutionality of various Ceiling Acts passed by the States concerned. In view of this decision the learned counsel for the petitioners was fair enough to state that he does not want to press his contention regarding the constitutional validity of the Ceiling Act. Similarly, the learned counsel for the petitioners fairly conceded that as the 1955 Act, along with its amendments up to 1972, has been placed in the Ninth Schedule of the Constitution, it was immune from challenge and was saved by the protective umbrella contained in Art. 31-B of the Constitution. In this connection, this position was made absolutely clear in Waman Rao's case (supra) where this Court observed as follows:

(2.) In the instant case, it is clear that the 1955 Act as also the Amendment Act of 1972 were added to the Ninth Schedule, being Entry Nos. 60 and 81, prior to April 24, 1973. In these circumstances, it is manifest that the aforesaid Acts are completely immune from challenge on the ground that they are violative of any of the rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. The learned counsel for the petitioners, therefore, was fully justified in making the concession before us.

(3.) The argument of the learned counsel for the petitioners in W. P. No. 1345 of 1979. which has been adopted by the counsel for the petitioners appearing in other petitions, centres round the validity of-