KSHITISH CHANDRA BOSE Vs. COMMISSIONER OF RANCHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a plaintiff's appeal by special leave against a judgment and decree of the Patna High Court dated 30th September, 1970 and arises in the following circumstances :

(2.) In the suit the plaintiff based his claim in respect of plot No. 1735, Ward No. 1 of Ranchi Municipality on the ground that he had acquired title to the land by virtue of a Hukumnama granted to him by the landlord as far back as 17th April, 1912. which is Exhibit 18. Apart from the question of title, the plaintiff further pleaded that even it the land belonged to the defendant municipality, he had acquired title by prescription by being in possession of the land to the knowledge of the municipality for more than 30 years, that is to say, from 1912 to 1957.

(3.) The trial Court accepted the plaintiff's case and decreed the plaintiff's suit both on the question of title and adverse possession. The defendant filed an appeal before the Additional Judicial Commissioner, Ranchi (Chota Nagpur) which after a consideration of the evidence affirmed the finding of the trial Court and maintained the decree of the trial Court on both points. Thereafter, the respondent went up in second appeal to the High Court which was heard by a single Judge of the Court who held that there was no clear evidence to show that the plaintiff had obtained title by adverse possession and by his judgment of 17-2-1967 (hereinafter to be referred to as the first judgment) remanded the case to the trial Court for a decision only on the question of title. The effect of the order of remand was that so far as plaintiff's case that he had acquired title by prescription was concerned, it was finally decided against him. After remand the Additional Judicial Commissioner held that the municipality had proved its title to the land in dispute and accordingly dismissed the plaintiff's suit. The plaintiff then went up in appeal to the High Court which affirmed the finding of the Additional Judicial Commissioner and dismissed the appeal by its judgment of 30-9-1967 (or 30-9-1970 ) (hereinafter referred to as the second judgment). Hence, this appeal by special leave.