(1.) The appellant was since 1945, serving as an assistant goods clerk at various railway stations on the Eastern Railway. He did so till January 1963 when he was suspended from service. The last two railway stations where he served were Buxar and Patna Junction between 1957 to 1963.
(2.) He was tried by the Special Judge, Patna under Section 5 (1) read with Section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act 2 of 1947, the charge being that while working as an assistant goods clerk at Buxar and Patna between April 1956 and March 1959 he was habitually accepting and obtaining or agreeing to accept or demanding illegal gratification and also for misconduct in the discharge of his official duties as contemplated by sub-section (3) of that section. His defence was that he was falsely involved in the charge by the traders who resented his strictness against transgression of the railway rules and by trade union rivals in league with the investigating Officer. He also denied that he acquired or was in possession of properties or pecuniary resources disproportionate to his known sources of income.
(3.) The learned Trial Judge held that except for one instance where he demanded Rupees 15/- as illegal gratification the rest of the instance alleged against him had not been established. The appellant, therefore, could not be said to be habitually accepting or obtaining or demanding illegal gratification within the meaning of Clause (a) of Section 5 (1) . But he accepted the prosecution case of the appellant being in possession of properties and pecuniary resources disproportionate to the known sources of his income and on that finding held him guilty under section 5 (2) and sentenced him to two years' rigorous imprisonment. On appeal against the said conviction, the High Court confirmed the sentence and dismissing the appeal held that although the case against the appellant that he was habitually demanding or accepting illegal gratification had not been proved, and only one instance of demanding bribe had been provided, it was enough for the purpose of sub-section (2) of Section 5 that it had also been established that he was in possession of properties disproportionate to his known source of income, and was therefore, guilty of misconduct in the discharge of his official duties as envisaged by sub-section (3) of Section 5. Hence this appeal by special leave.