(1.) The respondent joined the Department of Posts as Postal Assistant in the year 1991 and earned his promotion from time to time to Assistant Superintendent of Posts in the year 2008, a Group-B Gazetted cadre post. A charge memo bearing No. Vig/105/10 dated 13.04.2010 (hereinafter referred as "the Memo") was issued to him by the Disciplinary Authority, Department of Posts under Rule-14 of the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1965 (hereinafter referred as "the 1965 Rules"). The Memo enumerated 9 charges. Suffice to say that certain charges related to procedural lapses in discharge of duties while another set of charges dealt with alleged illegal gratification received by way of bribes. Accordingly, violation of duties under the Central Civil Services (Conduct) Rules, 1964 was alleged.
(2.) The respondent contested the Memo at the threshold itself on the ground that the charges included allegations of bribery and thus had a vigilance angle. As such, it was averred that it could not have been issued without prior approval of the Central Vigilance Officer (hereinafter referred as "CVO") as mandated by a circular dated 18.01.2005 of the Department of Posts, Ministry of Communication and IT. (hereinafter referred to as "the Circular"). The Circular advised that all cases of officers below the level of Group 'A' involving vigilance angle should be referred to the Directorate for consideration and advice by the CVO of the relevant department. Even for closing the cases after a preliminary enquiry report, the procedure was stated to be mandatory. The circular reads as under:
(3.) In this background, the respondent assailed the Memo by filing OA No. 421 of 2015 before the Central Administrative Tribunal at Hyderabad (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribunal"). The validity of the Memo was inter alia assailed on the grounds that (a) the mandatory advice of the CVO had not been obtained; (b) the charge memo was vague, non-specific, and in violation of sub-Rule (i)(3) of Rule 14 of the 1965 Rules, and (c) that there had been an inordinate delay in concluding the proceedings. The appellant department contested the petition and the tribunal decided against the respondent by order dated 19.09.2016. We may notice at this stage that the litigation before the Tribunal was not the first round of litigation but was preceded by earlier petitions being filed. The Tribunal opined that the issue of the prior approval of CVO had already been dealt with in an earlier proceeding initiated by the respondent in O.A. No. 861 of 2013. There, it was concluded that the approval was more of a safeguard against dropping of inquiry proceedings against delinquent officials on fictitious grounds. Additionally, the delay in concluding the proceedings was held to be attributable to the respondent on account of repeated petitions alleging bias and related appeals preferred by him. In this context, a direction was issued to conclude the inquiry within 6 months. This order was assailed by the respondent by filing a Writ Petition No. 42546 of 2016 on the sole ground that the Memo had not been issued in compliance of the Circular. The High Court opined that the Circular did not mandate any prior approval of the CVO before issuance of the memo. It was also noted that not all charges against the respondent revolved around allegations of bribery. The respondent then approached this Court by way of SLP(C) No.9571 of 2017.