VIJAY PEINULY Vs. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On 19/10/2015, a complaint was filed by the father of 'X' alleging that on 26/9/2015 when she was coming from Bhatgaon to meet her mother at Khaleti, the appellant lured her into his shop and committed rape. FIR was registered against the appellant for an offence under Sec. 376(2)(l), IPC. The victim was sent for medical examination on the same day. Thereafter, the appellant was arrested on 20/10/2015. The Trial Court convicted the appellant under Sec. 376(2)(l), IPC and sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for a period of 10 years, along with a fine of Rs.25,000.00. The conviction and the sentence was affirmed by the High Court.

(2.) Mr. Kaleeswaram Raj, learned Amicus Curiae appearing for the appellant, submitted that the conviction and the sentence of the appellant deserves to be set aside for various reasons. He argued that the statement of the victim could not be recorded under Sec. 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.) as she was found not fit for recording such statement. Even the chief examination of the prosecutrix was in a question-and-answer format and therefore, it cannot be relied upon. He argued that the oral evidence of the prosecutrix is not supported by the medical evidence. He highlighted the contradictions in the evidence of the prosecution witnesses to argue that, at the most, this is a case of an offence under Sec. 354, IPC. Further, it was urged by Mr. Raj that there is no credible evidence on the basis of which the conviction of the appellant under Sec. 376(2) (l), IPC can be sustained. He relied upon a judgment of this Court in Santosh Prasad Santosh Kumar vs. State of Bihar reported in (2020) 3 SCC 443 which according to him has similar facts.

(3.) Dr. Abhishek Atrey, the learned counsel appearing for the respondent, took us through the evidence of the prosecutrix reliable to submit that conviction can be based on her sole testimony. He referred to the evidence of the parents of the prosecutrix to submit that further corroboration of the prosecutrix's testimony was not required, if such testimony was credible.