NACHHATAR SINGH Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by way of special leave arises out of the following facts:

(2.) The Court nevertheless went on to hold that though there were no specific instances of demands of dowry yet an inference that certain demands had been made was available from their testimony and the other documentary evidence on record and particularly, that no woman who had a young child would commit suicide (as had happened in the present case) unless she had been driven to it by the ill treatment meted out to her. The accused were, accordingly, acquitted of the offences under Section 304B of the IPC but convicted under Section 306 IPC and awarded a sentence of four years. It is the conceded case that a Special Leave Petition filed by Nachhattar Singh, the husband, has since been dismissed. The present appeal is thus confined only to the in-laws i.e. Nirmal Singh and Harbans Kaur, the Appellants before us.

(3.) We have gone through the evidence as also the reasons given by the High Court to arrive at its conclusions. It will be seen that the allegations against the accused were that they had driven the deceased to suicide on account of cruelty which included demands for dowry. The High Court has rejected the story about the demands for dowry but has drawn an inference that there must have been some cruelty which had forced a young woman to suicide despite the fact that she had a young child. We find that in the background of the findings recorded while acquitting the accused of the charge under Section 304B of the IPC, no inferences or presumptions can be drawn. Moreover, a perusal of Section 498A IPC would show that cruelty would mean any wilful conduct which was of such a nature as was likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical) to the woman. We find no evidence on this score and it has been so found by the High Court. On the contrary, a perusal of the evidence of P.W. 6 shows that the defence story is in fact reflected in his cross-examination. He initially testified that it was wrong to suggest that she did not want to stay in the village or that she wanted to join service but in the very next line he admitted that the reason that the deceased was not encouraged to shift to Moga was that as the Appellants were old they had wanted her to work in the house and to look after them. In this view of the matter, we find that the wilful conduct referred to above should be of such a nature as would provoke a person of common prudence to commit suicide and a difference of opinion within a family on everyday mundane matters would not fall within that category. We find that merely because the Appellants were of the opinion that the deceased, as a good daughter-in-law, should look after them in old age could not be said to an abetment of suicide. The presumption against the Appellants raised under Section 113A of the Evidence Act, 1872 cannot thus be drawn. We are, therefore, of the opinion that the High Court's judgment suffers from serious contradictions. We, accordingly, allow this appeal and set aside the conviction of the Appellants before us. Their bail bonds be discharged.