SARAH MATHEW Vs. INSTITUTE OF CARDIO VASCULAR DISEASES

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Mr K. Swami, learned counsel appearing for the appellant, submitted that the High Court, Institute of Cardio Vascular Diseases v. Sarah Mathew, Criminal OP No. 12001 of 1997, decided on 17-7-2002 (Mad), was clearly wrong in holding that the proceeding against the respondents was barred by limitation, as provided under Section 468(2)(c) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, because the order issuing summons against the accused was passed by the Magistrate after three years from the date of the occurrence, even though the complaint was admittedly filed within the period of limitation. In support of the contention, he relies upon a two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., 2003 8 SCC 559 in which, on an examination of the provisions contained in Chapter XXXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, it was held that the Court can take cognizance of an offence, the complaint of which is filed before it, within the period of limitation prescribed and, if need be, after excluding such time which is legally excludable. It further held that the limitation prescribed is not for taking cognizance within the period of limitation, but for taking cognizance of an offence in regard to which a complaint is filed or prosecution is initiated beyond the period of limitation prescribed under the Code of Criminal Procedure. The decision in Bharat Damodar Kale v. State of A.P., 2003 8 SCC 559 is followed in another two-Judge Bench decision of this Court in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, 2007 7 SCC 394. In para 52 of the decision in Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty, 2007 7 SCC 394, it was reiterated that for the purpose of computing the period of limitation, the relevant date must be considered as the date of filing of complaint or initiating criminal proceedings and not the date of taking cognizance by a Magistrate or issuance of process by a court.

(2.) Mr K.V. Viswanathan, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Respondent 1, submits that in both the decisions, an earlier three-Judge Bench decision in Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp1 SCC 121 was not taken note of. The decision in Krishna Pillai4, though arising under the Child Marriage Restraint Act, 1929, also dealt with the period of limitation prescribed for taking cognizance, as provided under Section 9 of that Act.

(3.) In Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran, 1990 Supp1 SCC 121 the Court after referring to the Constitution Bench decision in A.R. Antulay v. Ramdas Srini was Nayak, 1984 2 SCC 500 made the following observations: (Krishna Pillai case4, SCC p. 122, para 4)