LIMBAJI AND ORD Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) I. The three appellants herein faced trial in the Court of Sessions Judge, Osmanabad, for the offences punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 and Section 392 read with Section 34, IPC. They were charged of committing murder of one Baburao Nand Lagdive (hereinafter referred to as 'Baburao') at his field and robbing him of golden ear-rings and silver 'lingakar' worn by him in the early hours of 30th May, 1984. Both the accused and the deceased were the residents of village Shekapur.

(2.) There is no direct evidence as regards the involvement of accused in the murder and robbery of the deceased. As analysed by the Sessions Court and the High Court, the following circumstances were relied upon by the prosecution :-

(3.) As the presumption under Section 114 of Evidence Act looms large in this case a brief discussion on the basic postulates and evidentiary implications of presumption of fact may not be out of place. A presumption of fact is a type of circumstantial evidence which in the absence of direct evidence becomes a valuable tool in the hands of the Court to reach the truth without unduly diluting the presumption in favour of the innocence of the accused which is the foundation of our Criminal Law. It is an inference of fact drawn from another proved fact taking due note of common experience and common course of events. Holmes J. in Greer v. US, [245 USR 559] remarked "a presumption upon a matter of fact, when it is not merely a disguise for some other principle, means that common experience shows the fact to be so generally true that Courts may notice the truth". Section 114 of the Evidence Act shows the way to the Court in its endeavour to discern the truth and to arrive at a finding with reasonable certainty. Under the Indian Evidence Act, the guiding rules for drawing the presumption are set out broadly in the section. Section 114 enjoins : "the Court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct and public and private business, in their relation to facts of the particular case." Having due regard to the germane considerations set out in the section, certain presumptions which the Court can draw are illustratively set out. It is obvious that they are not exhaustive or comprehensive. The presumption under Section 114 is, of course, rebuttable. When once the presumption is drawn, the duty of producing evidence to the contra so as to rebut the presumption is cast on the party who is subjected to the rigour of that presumption. Before drawing the presumption as to the existence of a fact on which there is no direct evidence, the facts of the particular case should remain uppermost in the mind of the Judge. These facts should be looked into from the angle of common sense, common experience of men and matters and then a conscious decision has to be arrived at whether to draw the presumption or not.