SAMIR MUKHERJEE Vs. DAVINDER K BAJAJ

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this appeal by special leave the appellant has impugned the judgment of the Division Bench of Delhi High Court passed in R.F.A. No. 325 of 1997 by which the High Court upheld the judgment of the Additional District Judge, Delhi.

(2.) The respondents filed a suit for eviction of the appellant from the suit land and also for recovery of arrears of rent and damages/mesne profits. According to respondents the appellant was a monthly tenant and, therefore, 15 days' notice terminating the tenancy, as required under Section 106 of Transfer of Property Act (for short 'the Act') was issued, receipt of which was not disputed. The tenancy was created by an oral agreement. The appellant admitted the tenancy but pleaded that the intention of the parties at the time of its creation was to grant tenancy permanently because the lease was granted in favour of the appellant for manufacturing purpose and since the inception of the tenancy, the appellant was carrying on business of manufacturing transmission towers and railway electrification fittings. On these facts it was pleaded that the lease would be deemed to be from year to year as per the provisions of Section 106 of the Act and, therefore, notice to quit ought to have been given for 6 months expiring on last date of the year of the tenancy. Before the trial Court an application under Order XII, Rule 6, C.P.C. was filed which was allowed as according to the trial Court in the written statement there was clear admission by the appellant.

(3.) Before this Court, learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. Jaideep Gupta referring to the provisions of Section 106 of the Act has contended that since the lease was for manufacturing purpose, the legal presumption as envisaged in Section 106 of the Act would apply and, therefore, it was case of a tenancy from year to year terminable by 6 months' notice and not by 15 days' notice. The learned counsel has further contended that though under Section 107 of the Act a lease from year to year can be made only by a registered deed, this section nowhere controls the presumption laid down in Section 106 of the Act and as such the notice to quit in the present appeal is bad in law. In reply the learned senior counsel for the respondents, Mr. Verma has submitted that in view of the law laid down by this Court in Ram Kumar Das vs. Jagdish Chandra Deo, AIR 1952 SC 23 : (1952) 3 SCR 269 and Shri Janki Devi Bhagal Trust, Agra vs. Ram Swarup Jain (Dead) By LRs., (1995) 5 SCC 314, the contention of the learned counsel for the appellant is liable to be rejected.