LAWS(SC)-2001-11-40

PUSHPA DEVI Vs. BINOD KUMAR GUPTA

Decided On November 20, 2001
PUSHPA DEVI Appellant
V/S
BINOD KUMAR GUPTA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellants filed a suit for ejectment of the respondents on a ground allegedly available under Clause (c) of sub-section (1) of Section 11 of the Bihar Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1982 (hereinafter 'the Act', for short). According to the averments made in the plaint filed by the appellants, it was a part of the building which was held on tenancy by the respondents. According to the respondents, the subject-matter of tenancy was not a building as defined in Clause (b) of Section 2 of the Act but a piece of land whereon the respondents had raised a structure and using the same as a shop. Inasmuch as ejectment of the tenant-respondents was sought for on the ground of reasonable and in good faith requirement by landlord, the suit was tried by special procedure prescribed by Section 14 of the Act. The trial Court found the appellants owner of the suit premises held by the respondents on tenancy and the respondents liable to be evicted under Section 11(1)(c) of the Act.

(2.) The tenant-respondents preferred a revision under sub-section (8) of Section 14 of the Act. The High Court formed an opinion that the bone of contention between the parties, i.e., whether the subject-matter of lease was a vacant land or a building, was not satisfactorily disposed of by the trial Court and, therefore, the finding arrived at 'could not be said to be conclusive'. The High Court deemed it proper, in the interest of justice, to remand the case to the trial Court for decision afresh and in accordance with law. The High Court also allowed the parties a liberty of adducing further evidence. Feeling aggrieved by the order of remand, the landlords have filed this appeal by special leave.

(3.) It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that there was no prayer for remand made, nor any leave of adducing additional evidence sought for, by any of the parties and, therefore, there was no justification for the High Court to have set aside the order of the trial Court allowing liberty to the parties for adducing further evidence and thereafter deciding the matter afresh. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellants that the High Court should have decided the revision on the material available before it, and in the exercise of limited jurisdiction of revision, the High Court would not have found any reason to upset and reverse the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court while disposing of the suit before it in accordance with the practice and procedure of a Court of Small Causes.