TRIPURA GRAMIN BANK Vs. TARIF BARAN ROY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Defendants are in appeal against the judgment of Gauhati High Court (Agartala Bench) in Second Appeal No. 1/1993, The plaintiff was a cashier in the Gramin Bank and was appointed as such on 11/1/1983. While he was continuing as a cashier, as several irregularities and illegalities could be noticed, he was suspended with effect from 12/11/1984 and a disciplinary proceeding was initiated. He was served with a set of charges and he also replied to those charges. In the enquiry conducted, the charges were held to be established and on the basis of the finding of the enquiry officer the disciplinary authority finally imposed the punishment of dismissal from service. He preferred an appeal against the same to the departmental authorities and having been unsuccessful therein, filed the suit seeking a declaration that the order of dismissal from service is illegal and void. Before the trial court, the employer Bank denied the allegations made in the plaint and further contended that the disciplinary proceedings have been taken in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and there has been no infirmity in the procedure conducted by the enquiry officer and therefore the order of dismissal cannot be held to be invalid on any account. The trial Judge, however, agreed with the contentions raised on behalf of the plaintiff and decreed the suit on a finding that the enquiry itself stood vitiated on account of violation of principle of natural justice. Against the judgment and decree of the trial court, the Bank preferred the appeal, which was registered as Title Appeal No. 32/1991. The Additional District Judge, West Tripura allowed the appeal and came to a conclusion that against an order of a domestic Tribunal, civil court would be entitled to interfere with the finding thereon only when the court would come to a conclusion that there has been a denial of natural justice or there has been a violation of Fundamental Right and it would not be open for the civil court to re-appreciate the evidence and come to its own conclusion on the materials on which the enquiry officer found the charges to have been established against a delinquent servant. The lower Appellate Court then came to the conclusion that all the allegations were based on documents only, which were duly inspected by the respondent (plaintiff) and there was no denial of reasonable opportunity even though some of the witnesses were not examined and further so long as the enquiry is properly conducted and the principles of natural justice are complied with, the departmental authorities are the sole Judges of the facts and if there be some legal evidence on which their findings can be based, the adequacy or reliability of the evidence is not a matter which can be permitted to be canvassed before the civil court. The judgment and decree of the trial Judge having been set aside and the appeal having been allowed, the plaintiff preferred the second appeal to the High Court. The High Court by the impugned judgment appears to have re-examined the materials on the basis of which charges were levelled against the plaintiff as well as the conclusion arrived at by the enquiry officer on those charges. In respect of some of the charges, the High Court came to the conclusion that though charges could not have been said to have been established on the materials on record, the High Court however came to the conclusion that the charges 4, 7, 9, 10 and 11 which relate to misconduct of the plaintiff must be held to have been established in the case. High Court was persuaded to agree with the submission made on behalf of the learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff that since the plaintiff was not aware of maintenance of the books of accounts and registers there might be some omissions in making those entries regarding withdrawal and deposits of different customers but since the so called charge of defalcation cannot be held to have been established, the ultimate punishment inflicted upon must be held to be disproportionate, snatching away the only source of livelihood of the plaintiff, who was the only earning member of the family. With this conclusion, the High Court having set aside the judgment of the lower Appellate Court and having affirmed the judgment and decree of the trial court, the Bank is in appeal.

(2.) Be it be stated that in paragraph 25 of the impugned judgment, the High Court has recorded its finding "it appears that there was considerable negligence on the part of the plaintiff-appellant discharging his duties as cashier of the respondent- Bank. Since the plaintiff-appellant has not discharged his duties properly and while discharging his duties the plaintiff-appellant has acted negligently, I am of the view that he should not be entitled to the back pay and allowances. "

(3.) Mr, Goswami, the learned senior Counsel appearing for the defendant-appellant contends that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction in exercising its power under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure by re-appreciating the materials on the basis of which the enquiry officer came to the conclusion about the finding of guilt of delinquent Government servant and therefore the impugned judgment cannot be sustained in law. Mr. Goswami, further contended that the High Court itself having found that at least 5 of the charges must be held to have been established against the delinquent and that the plaintiff was discharging his duties negligently as cashier and did not discharge his duties properly and acted negligently, it was improper on the part of the High Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment and setting aside an order of dismissal. In support of this contention, the learned Counsel places reliance on the three-Judge Bench decision of this Court in B. C. Chaturvedi v. U. O. I. [jt 1995 (8) SC 65 = 1995 (6) SCC 749]. In that particular case, this Court has taken note of several earlier decisions on the point starting from State of Orissa v. M. Bidyabhushan Mohapatra [air 1963 SC 779], U. O. I, v. Sardar Bahudar [1972 (4) SCC 618] and a host of other decisions and has recorded the conclusion that it would not be proper for the Court to interfere with the quantum of punishment unless the conscience of the Court is found to be shocking and this must be done only in rare cases where facts situation so demand.