B KRISHNA BHAT Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant before us along with some other petitioners had filed Writ Petition Nos. 4394-4410/88 before the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore contending, inter alia, that the Bangalore Development Authority (the BDA) had no sanction under Section 29 of the Bangalore Development Authority Act, (for short 'the BDA Act') to levy any tax, cess or fee on the owners of lands and buildings situated outside the corporation limits of the Bangalore City Corporation. They had also contended that Section 29 of the Act was unconstitutional, ultra vires and void. A learned single Judge who heard the said writ petition after examining the various provisions of the Act as well as the Bangalore Municipal Corporation Act, 1949 (the Corporation Act) came to the conclusion that under the BDA Act, there was no inherent power to assess, impose and recover taxes, cess and fees other than the betterment tax. The Court also held that the power to levy and recover taxes, cess and fees has to be expressly conferred on the BDA by the BDA Act and such power cannot be presumed by mere implication. It further held that there was no material on record to hold that the BDA has been rendering any service to the members of the public who own lands and/or buildings which service should correspond to taxes, cess and fees recoverable because such tax is service related. The said finding of the learned single Judge came to be affirmed by the appellate Bench in Writ Appeal Nos. 223-39/92. After the said judgment of the Division Bench, an Ordinance was promulgated which later became an Act of the Legislature whereby the principal BDA Act came to be amended by the Bangalore Development Authority (Amendment) Act, 1993. By this Amending Act, Sections 28-A, 28-B and 28-C were incorporated in the said Act. By these amendments, the BDA was statutorily entrusted with the obligation of providing certain civic amenities specified in Section 28-A of the Act and in Section 28-B the BDA was specifically empowered to levy and collect property tax in the same manner and at the same rate as was provided in the Corporation Act. Under Section 28-C the BDA was given the status of a local body to collect the cess payable under the various Acts specified in the said section and Section 7 of the Amending Act validated all the collection made by the BDA which was declared as without authority of law by the earlier judgment of the High Court.

(2.) The Amending Act was challenged again by the applicant in a writ petition on the ground that the Amending Act suffered from the vice of excessive delegation and was also arbitrary and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. It was also argued that the Amending Act not having removed the vice pointed out by the High Court, it was beyond the legislative power to validate an invalid collection of tax. The said challenge being negatived by the High Court, the appellant is before us in this appeal.

(3.) Before us, the appellant contends that the delegation of power to the BDA is bad because the BDA is only a statutory body and not being an elected body, could not have been entrusted with any taxing power. For this proposition the appellant strongly placed reliance on a judgment of this Court in Municipal Corporation of Delhi vs. Birla Cotton, Spinning and Weaving Mills, Delhi, (1968) 3 SCR 251. In the said judgment the majority, while upholding the validity of the delegated legislation and negativing the contention of excessive delegation, among other factors, found that delegation to an elected body was in itself a safe way of delegation because an elected body responsible to the people including those who pay taxes would act responsibly in the exercise of the said delegated power. But this Court in that case nowhere held that delegation of a taxing power to a non-elected body would suffer from the vice of excessive delegation. Therefore, the argument of the appellant grounded solely on the ratio laid down in Birla Cotton Mills case (supra) should fail.