STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH Vs. SHATRUHAN LAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Leave granted.

(2.) The State of Uttar Pradesh is in appeal against the judgment of a learned Single Judge of Allahabad High Court in Criminal Appeal no. 512/1983. The accused respondent stood convicted under Section 161 of the Indian Penal Code and section 5 (2) of Prevention of Corruption Act and sentenced to imprisonment for 2 years under Section 161, Indian Penal Code and 2 years under section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption act. In appeal, the accused not having pressed the appeal on merits, the High Court upheld the conviction of the accused, but so far as the sentence is concerned, altered the sentence to the period already undergone. It is still surprising to note that after altering the sentence, as stated above, the High Court further directs that the order of conviction will not affect the service of the appellant in the capacity as a public Servant. We fail to understand wherefrom the High Court gets this jurisdiction to make such observation. Even on the question of sentence, we find that Section 5 (2) originally did not provide for a compulsory period of sentence. But the Parliament amended the provision on the ground that experience shows that there has been a tendency amongst the Courts to deal tod leniently with public Servants convicted under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The object and reason of the amendment indicates that where imprisonment is awarded, the period is frequently too small to have adequate punitive or deterrent effect and the amounts of fine imposed are frequently grossly incommensurate with the corrupt gains, and the intended amendment was thought of as a measure which will ensure that adequate punishment is awarded in cases of proved corruption. In the teeth of the aforesaid provision without any rhyme and reason, the High Court was wholly unjustified in altering the sentence already undergone merely because the incident was of year 1977. In the aforesaid premises, we have no hesitation to come to the conclusion that the High Court erred in law in interfering with the sentence awarded as well as in making observation that the conviction will not affect the service of the accused person in the Public Employment. We therefore set aside the impugned judgment and allow this appeal. Appeal allowed.