SHAMBHU DAYAL AGARWALA Vs. STATE OF WEST BENGAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Special leave granted.

(2.) The short station which arises for our determination is whether the Collector to whom a report of seizure of any essential commodity is made under S. 6-A of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (hereinafter called 'the Act') , is empowered by virtue of S. 6-E of the Act to release the goods seized in pursuance of an order made under S. 3 in relation thereto during the pendency of the proceedings before the Special court The facts, in brief, are as under: The petitioner being engaged in the manufacture of mustard oil at his factory at I, Canal Road, Police Station Behala. Calcutta-53, was required to maintain a stock of mustard seed at his factory premises. A contingent of officers of the District Enforcement Branch led by the Investigating Officer Gopal Mosat, the complainant, raided the factory premises of the petitioner on the morning of Sunday, 20/09/1987, in the absence of the petitioner. The said raid continued till the early hours of 21/09/1987. During the said raid 562 bags of mustard seeds and 267 tins of mustard oil, weighing about 39.92 quintals, were seized for purported infraction of the conditions of the licence as well as the orders issued under S. 3 of the Act. The Investigating Officer filed a written complaint in that behalf at the Behala Police Station which came to be treated as the first information report. The report of the seizure of the essential commodity was made to the concerned Collector as required by S. 6-A of the Act for initiating confiscation proceedings. On 27/09/1987, a charge-sheet was filed before the , learned Special Judge. It may be mentioned that before the submissionof the charge-sheet a writ petition was filed in the High court wherein certain interim orders were made with which we are not concerned. Suffice it to say that the said writ petition was disposed of by a learned Single Judge of the High court on 2/02/1988, reserving liberty to the petitioner to apply for release of the seized goods to the Collector before whom the confiscation proceedings were pending. Thereupon, the petitioner preferred an application on 9/02/1988 under S. 6-E of the Act before the Additional Collector for release of the seized commodities. On March if, 1988 the said officer dropped the confiscation proceedings, albeit without prejudice to the prosecution pending before the Special Judge, and directed the release of the seized commodities. Feeling aggrieved by the said order of release, the State government invoked the revisional jurisdiction of the High court. The said Criminal Revision No. 402 of 1988 was allowed by the High court on 11/05/1988. The High court set aside the impugned order of release of the seized goods holding that under the provisions of S. 6-A read with S. 6-E of the Act, the Collector had no power to order release of the seized commodity. The High court approached the question thus:

(3.) Mr P. P. Rao, the learned counsel for the petitioner/appellant contended that on the Collector having dropped the confiscation proceedings it was incumbent on him to pass the consequential order of release under S. 6-E of the Act. According to him since the jurisdiction of the court to make orders with regard to the possession, delivery, disposal, release or distribution of such essential commodity is specifically and expressly barred by S. 6-E of the Act, the Collector alone has jurisdiction to order release of the seized goods. The words 'pending confiscation employed in S. 6-E of the Act go with the word Seize and are, therefore, descriptive of the essential commodity and are not intended to limit the powers of the Collector, argued counsel. He, therefore, submitted that S. 6-E confers wide powers on the Collector torelease the goods at any stage of the proceedings and the High court was not justified in placing a narrow construction on the language of the said provision. On the other hand Mr Kapil Sibal, the learned Additional Solicitor General while supporting the impugned order of the High court, argued that the power to release conferred by S. 6-E on the Collector refers to release in favour of a third party and not the party from whom the essential commodity was seized. According to him if the construction placed on S. 6-E on behalf of the petitioner is accepted it would defeat the very purpose of the Act. He, therefore, submitted that this was not a fit case to interfere with the order passed by the division bench of the High court.