K L MALHOTRA Vs. PRAKASH MEHRA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Having heard Mr. Garg, learned counsel in support of this case that there is serious infirmity in the findings arrived at by the Rent Controller as well as by the High Court inasmuch as they have not taken into consideration that an application under Section 14(1)(e) of the Rent Control Act was pending and the Rent Controller granted leave to the petitioner to defend and the same is pending in this Court. In the meantime, however, the admitted fact is that on 1 st December, 1985 the petitioner i.e., the landlady's husband died and she became widow. It is also not disputed that in 1988 Section 14D was inserted in the Rent Control Act which confers special benefit on the widow to apply for an order or decree for recovery of possession of any premises against her tenant. The landlady admittedly applied for recovery of possession of the premises in question on 3rd July, 1989 i.e. within one year from the date of enforcement of'the provisions of Section 14D as provided in the said Act. Therefore, the contention about delay in making the application is of no substance and also there is no merit in it. The second submission which was made by Mr. Garg, with great emphasis and vehemence is that since the application under Section 14(1)(e) is pending, the landlady was not competent to make an application for eviction of the tenant-respondent under S.14D of the Act. This argument on the face of it is wholly inconsistent being without any merit whatsoever. S. 14D was brought into being by the legislature in its wisdom to confer special benefit and a right on the widow to get eviction of any part of the premises or any premises for her own occupation or residence. In that view of the matter this argument does not stand a moment's scrutiny. It has been next argued by learned counsel for the petitioner that S. 14D is arbitrary as it does not lay down any guidelines and it is also discriminatory being violative of Art. 14 of the Constitution. Mr. G. Ramaswamy, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent submitted before us that this question of validity or invalidity of the provisions of S. 14D was neither raised nor argued even before the High Court nor any ground was taken to that effect before High Court. It is for the first time in the special leave petition this point has been raised and as such the petitioner cannot be permitted to argue this point here for the first time in this Court. There is substance in the submission made by learned counsel for the respondent. Moreover, it does not appear to us on a plain reading of S. 14D itsell'that the benefit conferred on a widow for applying for eviction of her premises is at par with the general benefit conferred on the landlord to seek for eviction on the ground of bona fide need. Admittedly, on the face of it the class on which the benefit was granted by S. 14D is per se different from the class whose rights have been protected by S. 14(1)(e). Therefore on the face of it this argument also is without any merit.

(2.) We have carefully gone through the decisions rendered by the Rent Controller as well as by the High Court and we find no infirmity in the findings arrived at by the Courts below. In this view of the matter the application for special leave is summarily dismissed.

(3.) On the prayer of the learned counsel for the petitioner time is granted for vacating the premises till 30th November, 1990 with the usual undertaking to be filed within two weeks from today.