BHAGWAN DASS Vs. JILEY KAUR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) - This appeal by special leave has been preferred against the judgment of the Allahabad High Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant. Facts necessary for the decision of this appeal may be stated in a nutshell.

(2.) Respondent No. l, Smt. Jiley Kaur, is the landlord, within the meaning of the said expression as contained in the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') of a shop which is in the occupation of the appellant as a tenant. An application was made by respondent No. 1 for the release of the said shop under Section 21(1)(a) of the Act on the ground that two of her sons had grown up and were unemployed and the shop was needed to enable them to carry on business. The application was contested by the appellant on the ground that the need of the landlord was not bona fide and that in any view of the matter greater hardship shall be caused to him in case an order of eviction was passed, than the hardship, which was likely to be caused to respondent No. 1 in the event of the application for release being dismissed. On a consideration of the evidence produced by the parties, the Prescribed Authority agreed with the case set up by the appellant in his defence and dismissed the application for release. Aggrieved by that decision, respondent No. 1 preferred an appeal which was allowed by the District Judge, Ghaziabad. He came to the conclusion that the need of the landlord was bona fide and that greater hardship would be caused to her in the event of her application for release being dismissed then the hardship which may be caused to the appellant on the said application being allowed. It is this order which was challenged in the writ petition before the High Court which was dismissed by the judgment appealed against.

(3.) It has been urged by learned counsel for the appellant that the District Judge has committed an error in reversing the order of the Prescribed Authority on both the points referred to above. In support of his plea that the finding of the District Judge on the question of bona fide need of the landlord was erroneous, he has urged that apart from the two premises which have been noticed by the District Judge and which according to the appellant could be used as a shop by the sons of respondent No. 1, there was another shop in Mohalla Jatwara which even though had been taken into consideration by the Prescribed Authority has been completely ignored by the District Judge. From a perusal of the judgment of the District Judge, however, it appears that while bringing to his notice alternative accommodations available to respondent No. 1, the said shop was not brought to his notice on behalf of the appellant. In our opinion, the reason, therefor, seems to be obvious. A perusal of the order of the Prescribed Authority indicates that this shop did not belong to respondent No. 1 but belonged to her sister, Smt. Chandro Devi. The Prescribed Authority adopted a curious reasoning in holding that this shop was also available to respondent No. 1. What has been stated in this behalf is that since the sister of the respondent No. 1 was the co-owner of the shop in dispute. "the applicant is still in a very good position by getting rent and also having many of the houses in possession." Apparently, the accommodation belonging to Chandro Devi, the sister of respondent No. 1, could not be treated to be an accommodation available to respondent No. 1 for being used by her sons to carry on business. As regards, the remaining two premises the finding of the District Judge that notwithstanding the fact that respondent No. 1 was possessed of those two premises, they could not be used for the purposes of business by the sons of respondent No. 1 for the reasons stated by him in his order is essentially one of fact based on appraisal of evidence and no exception can be taken to the stand of the High Court in not interfering with that finding in a writ petition.