PREM SHANKAR SHUKLA Vs. DELHI ADMINISTRATION

JUDGEMENT

(1.) "When they arrested my neighbour I did not protest. When they arrested the men and women in the opposite house I did not protest. And when they finally came for me, there was nobody left to protest". (1)

(2.) The facts are largely beyond dispute and need brief narration so that the law may be discussed and declared. The basic assumption we humanistically make is that even a prisoner is a person, not an animal that an under-trial prisoner a fortiori, so. Our nation's founding document admits of no exception on this subject as Sunil Batra's case, (1978) 4 SCC 494 : (AIR 1978 SC 1675) has clearly stated. Based on this thesis all measures authorised by the law must be taken by the court to keep the stream of prison justice unsullied

(3.) A condensed statement of the facts may help concretise the legal issue argued before us. A prisoner sent a telegram to a Judge of this court (one of us) complaining of forced handcuffs on him and other prisoners, implicitly protesting against the humiliation and torture of being held in irons in public, back and forth, when, as under-trials kept in custody in the Tihar Jail, they were being taken to Delhi courts for trial of their cases. The practice persisted, bewails the petitioner, despite the court's direction not to use irons on him and this led to the telegraphic 'litany' to the Supreme Court which is the functional sentinel on the qui vive where 'habeas' justice is in jeopardy. If iron enters the soul of law and of the enforcing agents of law - rather if it is credibly alleged so - this court must fling aside forms of procedure and defend the complaining individuals's personal liberty under Articles 14, 19 and 21 after due investigation. Access to human justice is the essence of Article 32, and sensitized by this dynamic perspective we have examined the facts and the law and the rival versions of the petitioner and the Delhi Administration. The blurred area of 'detention jurisprudence' where considerations of prevention of escape and personhood of prisoner come into conflict, warrants fuller exploration than this isolated case necessitates and counsel on both sides (Dr. Chitale as amicus curiae, aided ably by Shri Mudgal, and Shri Satchthey for the State) have rendered brief oral assistance and presented written submissions on a wider basis. After all, even while discussing the relevant statutory provisions and constitutional requirements, court and counsel must never forget the core principle found in Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 :