VINOD KUMAR CHOWDHRY Vs. NARAIN DEVI TANEJA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment dated August 7, 1979 of a single Judge of the High Court of Delhi accepting a petition made by the landlady for revision of the order of an Additional Rent Controller (hereinafter called the Controller) of Delhi refusing to direct eviction of the tenant.

(2.) The landlady had sought eviction of the tenant from the premises in dispute on the ground covered by clause (e) of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 (hereinafter referred to as the Act), namely, that she required them bona fide for occupation as a residence for herself. Her application being triable in accordance with the procedure laid down in Section 25B of the Act, the tenant sought the controller's leave to contest it on grounds which were stated in his affidavit. The leave was granted and thereafter the tenant filed a written statement contesting his eviction which was ultimately disallowed. The learned Controller held that although the landlady had proved that she required the premises bona fide for her own occupation, she was disentitled to the relief claimed by her for two reasons which were (1) that she had not proved service on the tenant of a notice under Sec. 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, and, (2) that her application claimed eviction only in respect of a part of the premises let out which was not legally permissible. The landlady went up in revision to the High Court and the learned single Judge reversed both the findings which had been decided by the Controller against her. Two other points were raised before the High Court on behalf of the tenant. It was contended, firstly, that the petition for revision was incompetent in view of the provisions of sub-section (8) of Section 25B of the Act and that only an appeal as contemplated by Section 38 thereof should have been instituted before the Rent Control Tribunal (hereinafter called the Tribunal). The contention was negatived with the observation that a petition for revision as envisaged by sub-section (8) abovementioned lay against an order accepting or rejecting an eviction application, and against such an order alone, as laid down in Devi Singh v. Chaman Lal, 1977 Rajdhani LR 566; R. K. Parikh v. Uma Verma. ILR (1978) 2 Delhi 786; Bhagwati Pershad v. Om Perkash, 1979 Rajdhani LR 26 and Mahavir Singh v. Kamal Narain, 1979 Rajdhani LR 159. The second contention was that the lease deed on which the landlady relied in support of the alleged tenancy was unstamped and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This contention was repelled for the reason that although the said deed was taken on the file subject to the objection made on behalf of the tenant, the objection was never pressed at the time of argument before the Controller. It was also observed by the learned single Judge that the contention was practically meaningless as the tenant had never denied the tenancy in question. In the result the learned single Judge passed the impugned order directing the eviction of the tenant and, as already stated, that is the order impugned before us.

(3.) It has been vehemently contended before us on behalf of the tenant-appellant that the opinion of the High Court about the maintainability of the petition for revision of the order of the Controller is erroneous and that the only remedy open to the landlady against that order was by way of appeal to the Tribunal under Section 38 of the Act. In order to determine the acceptability of the contention it is necessary to undertake a somewhat detailed examination of some of the provisions of the Act, especially those which were introduced by a 1976 amendment with effect from 1st of December, 1975.