MAHANT RAM KISHAN DASS Vs. STATE OF PUNJAB

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Shri Lal appearing for the petitioner in the Special Leave Petition has raised a formidable number of points, although we are unable to agree with any of them. Earlier this Special Leave Petition had been disposed of by a certain limited direction which is not being interfered with by this order but counsel perhaps rightly pointed out that he had more to say than was covered by that order and, therefore, should be accorded a fuller hearing, We have heard him exhaustively but remain unconvinced about any of the points.

(2.) Shri Lal contended that the land sought to be acquired from his clients, though extensive in area, was contiguous with a 'samadhi' and, therefore, under the standing orders which have a statutory flavour (in his submission) could not be acquired without going through the exercise provided for. Since those procedures had not been followed the acquisition was bad in law. Counsel for the respondent-Trust had consented to the exclusion of two survey plots, namely, 3667 and 3668 on which the 'samadhi' actually stood. However, the considerable extent which was owned by the institution and lay contiguous, was acquired for development purposes. The contention is that contiguity with the 'samadhi' is inhibitive of compulsory acquisition. May be, that the plot strictly necessary for the survival of the 'samadhi' as such, is covered by the rule but all the lands that may lie continuous or continuous, however abundant or extensive, cannot be immunised against compulsory acquisition. Moreover, what is integral to or a necessary part of the 'samadhi', is a question of fact. The objection on this question has been considered by the Punjab Improvement Trust Act, 1922 as provided by the statute. The High Court having heard the petitioner had dismissed the petition at the threshold. Under Article 136 we cannot be lured into considering a question of fact like this. We negative the contention.

(3.) The second objection, grounded on a decision of this Court and using a constitution missile is that the freedom guaranteed under Art. 26 (c) of the Constitution to own and acquire property by a religious denomination is imperilled on account of this acquisition, and also has no basis. It is not as if a religious denomination cannot own land. It can under our Constitution hold properties. But such a right is not an absolute one nor unlimited altogether. The decision of this Court relied on by counsel has made the proposition clear: