M K PALANIAPPA CHETTIAR Vs. A PENNUSWAMI PILLAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The respondent in this appeal, who was the landlord of a building in Tiruchirapalli, filed an application under Section 10 (2) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act No. 18 of 1960 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") , for eviction of the 1st appellant who was his tenant, on the following four grounds

(2.) The Rent Controller, before whom the application for eviction was filed, dismissed the application holding on all the four grounds in favour of the tenant and against the landlord. An appeal before the appellate authority empowered under Section 23 of the Act was also unsuccessful. Before that authority, the ground which was principally urged was that the premises had been let out for purposes of carrying on a trade, while the tenant had used the premises for residential purposes. The plea taken by the tenant was that the lease was for residential as well as trade purposes and there had been no breach of the terms of the lease. The appellate authority recorded the finding that the building was let out for purposes of trade and, consequently, for non-residential purpose only. It further proceeded to hold that a very small portion of the building was being used for residential purposes and that did not amount to use of the building for a purpose contrary to that for which it was let out. Thereafter, the landlord moved a revision before the District court under Section 25 (1) (b) (ii) of the Act. The District court affirmed the finding and decision of the appellate authority. The landlord proceeded to file a revision in the High court of Madras against this decision under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High court set aside the decisions of the subordinate courts and granted a decree for eviction, holding that the building had been used for a purpose other than that for which it had been let out ; and it is against this decision that the tenant and his nephew, who was also impleaded with him as an opposite party, have come up to this court by special leave.

(3.) The first point urged on behalf of the tenant is that there was no error of jurisdiction in the decisions of the Rent Controller, the appellate authority, or the District court and consequently, the High court did not have jurisdiction to interfere in exercise of its powers under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The High court interfered under Section 115, C. P. C. , on the view that, on the facts found and on the pleadings, the suit for eviction should have been decreed. The view taken was that the tenant never took up the plea that, even if a part of the premises had been used for residential purposes, it did not amount to use against the terms of the lease, so that this plea was not open to be considered by the lower courts. The plea that was raised by the tenant was that the lease itself was for the dual purpose of residence as well as trade ; and that plea having failed, the application foreviction should have been allowed. On the face of it, this order made by. the High court does not proceed on the basis that any error of jurisdiction was committed by the lower courts. The courts had the jurisdiction either to grant the application or to reject it, depending on whether the landlord succeeded in proving that the tenant had used the building for a purpose other than the one for which it was let out, or failed to do so. Even if the finding by the lower courts was incorrect, it would be an error committed by those courts in the decision itself in proper exercise of their jurisdiction. It could not be held that, in giving such a decision, the courts exercised jurisdiction not vested in them. At the highest, the only criticism that could be levelled was that their decision suffered from an error of law ; but, however gross an error of law committed by those courts, the High court could not interfere under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure, specially when there was no procedural error committed by those courts. This principle was clearly laid down by this court in Keshardeo Chamria v. Radha Kissen Chamria and Others and vice versa. The same principle was affirmed in Pandurang Dhoni Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav. The errors committed by the courts do not relate to any question of fact which would determine their jurisdiction to deal with the proceedings before them. The error was purely in giving the decision in a case in which they had jurisdiction to decide the dispute that was raised before them. In these circumstances, it is clear that the High court was wrong in interfering with the setting aside the concurrent findings of the three lower courts, acting under Section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure.