RAM PRASAD VISHWAKARMA Vs. CHAIRMAN INDUSTRIAL TRIBUNAL PATNA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS appeal by special leave is against an order of the High Court of Judicature at Patna dismissing summarily an application of the present appellant under Art. 226 and Art. 227 of the Constitution. The appellant was a workman employed in the Digha factory of Bata Shoe Company (Private) Limited, since October, 1943. On 13/01/1954, the management of the company served him with a charge-sheet alleging that he had been doing anti-union activities inside the factory during the working hours and so was guilty under Sec. 12B (1) of the Standing Orders and Rules of the company. On January 14, he submitted a written reply denying the charge and asking to be excused. On January 15, the management made an order terminating his services, with effect from 18/01/1954. An industrial dispute was raised on this question of dismissal by the Union and was referred along with a number of other disputes to the Industrial Tribunal, Bihar, by a notification dated 29/04/1955. After written statements were filed by the Union and the management, 20/02/1956, was fixed for hearing at Patna. Thereafter numerous adjournments were given by the Tribunal on the joint petition for time filed by both the parties stating that all the disputes were going to be compromised. On 16/11/1956, the Tribunal made an order fixing 20/12/1956. "for filling compromise or hearing''. On 20/12/1956, however a fresh application for time was filed but it was stated that agreement had already been reached on some of the matters and opportunity was asked for to settle the other matters. The cases was however adjourned to 21/01/1957, for filling a compromise or hearing. On that date a further petition was again filed and a further extension of time was allowed till 1/02/1957. On January 31, the parties that is, the management and the Union filed a joint petition of compromise settling all points of disputes out of court.

(2.) PRIOR to this, on 12/01/1957, the present appellant had made an application praying that D. N. Ganguli and M. P. Gupta, two of his co-workers might be allowed to represent his case before the Tribunal instead of Fateh Singh, the Secretary of the Union and that he did not want his case to be represented by Fateh Singh as he had no faith in him. This application was dismissed by the Tribunal by an order dated 26/02/1957. On 7/03/1957, the appellant filed a fresh petition stating that he had not authorised Fateh Singh to enter into any agreement in his case and praying that the agreement filed in respect of his case should not be accepted and that he and his agents should be heard before the disposal of the case. This prayer was not allowed by the Tribunal and by an order dated 11/03/1957, an award in terms of the petition of compromise was made.

(3.) THE sole question that arises for our determination therefore is whether the appellant was entitled to separate representation in-spite of the fact that the Union which had espoused his cause was being represented by its Secretary, Fateh Singh. THE appellant's contention is that he was a party to the dispute in his own right and so was entitled to representation according to his own liking. THE question whether when a dispute concerning an individual workman is taken up by the Union, of which the workman is a member, as a matter affecting workmen in general and on that basis a reference is made under the Industrial Disputes Act the individual workman can claim to be heard independently of the Union is undoubtedly of some importance. THE question of representation of a workman who is a party to a dispute is dealt with by section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act. That section provides that such a workman is entitled to be represented in any proceeding under the Act, by (a) an officer of a registered trade union of which he is a member, (b) an officer of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union of which he is a member is affiliated and (c) where the workman concerned is not a member of any trade union by an officer of any trade union concerned with the industry, or by any other workman employed in that industry. THE appellant was the member of a trade union; and he was actually represented in the proceedings before the Tribunal by an officer of that Union, its Secretary, Fateh Singh. THE Union through this officer, filed a written statement on his behalf. Upto 12/01/1957, when the appellant filed his application for separate representation, this officer, was in charge of the conduct of the proceedings on behalf of the appellant. Never before that date, the appellant appears to have raised any objection to this representation. THE question is, whether, when thereafter he thought his interests were being sacrificed by his representative, he could claim to cancel that representation, and claim to be represented by somebody else. In deciding this question, we have on the one hand to remember the importance of collective bargaining in the settlement of industrial disputes, and on the other hand, the principle that the party to a dispute should have a fair hearing. In assessing the requirements of this principle, it is necessary and proper to take note also of the fact that when an individual workman becomes a party to a dispute under the Industrial Disputes Act he is a party, not independently of the Union which has espoused his cause.