STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH Vs. CHINTAMAN SADASHIVA WAISHAMPAYAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal by special leave is directed against the order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Nagpur quashing the order of dismissal passed by the appellant, the State of Madhya Pradesh, against the respondent Waishampayan on June 14, 1952. The respondent was appointed as a Sub-Inspector of Police, by the Inspector-General of Police, Central Provinces and Berar on January 1, 1943. Subsequently in January 1945, he was confirmed in that post. In September 1948, he was sent on deputation to Hyderabad State where he served as a Sub-Inspector of Police at Adilabad, Nirmal, Bhainsa and Nanded. He was working at Adilabad from September, 1948 till June, 1950. On May 13, 1951, he was served with an order of suspension issued on May 3, 1951, by the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, Eastern Range, Hyderabad Division. This order of suspension was issued because complaints had been received against him and a departmental enquiry was proposed to be held in that behalf. Accordingly on May 21, 1951, a chargesheet was framed against him and the same was delivered to him on June 13, 1951. This chargesheet included eight charges. In the enquiry which followed six witnesses were examined before Mr. Shamaldas, Sub-Divisional Officer (Police). On November 7, 1951, the District Superintendent of Police himself took up the enquiry under the orders of the Inspector-General of Police. He framed fresh charges because he thought that the charges previously framed were not clear. On this occasion five charges were framed against the respondent; however, charges four and five out of these were dropped, and the enquiry was confined to only three. Witnesses were examined during the course of this enquiry and were cross-examined by the respondent. On November 9, 1951, the respondent requested by an application that certain documents may be supplied to him to enable him to make his defence. His request was granted in respect of some documents but not with regard to all. After evidence had been led against the respondent he was directed to produce his witnesses on November 13, 1951, and he was warned that if he did not lead evidence on that date the enquiry would be closed. Meanwhile, on November 11, 1951, the respondent submitted an application to the Deputy Inspector-General of Police, through the District Superintendent, repeating his request for the documents which he wanted to inspect before leading evidence in defence and giving his own statement: that application was however rejected. On November 28, 1951, the District Superintendent of Police made his report in which he found that the respondent was guilty of all the three charges mentioned in the chargesheet, and he recommended that he should be dismissed from service. On receipt of this report, the Deputy Inspector-General of Police made his own endorsement on it and supported the recommendation for the dismissal of the respondent. The Inspector-General of Police, Hyderabad, then forwarded the papers to the Inspector-General of Police, Madhya Pradesh. On January 8, 1952, a notice was issued to the respondent by the Inspector-General of Police, Madhya Pradesh, to show cause why he should not be dismissed. The respondent duly submitted his reply on February 10, 1952. Thereafter on June 14, 1952, the Inspector-General of Police passed an order dismissing the respondent from service which the respondent received on June 17, 1952. The respondent then preferred an appeal against the said order but his appeal failed and was dismissed. It is under these circumstances that the respondent filed his petition in the High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution and challenged the validity of the order of dismissal on several grounds. This petition was resisted by the appellant; but by the majority decision of the Special Bench of the High Court which heard this petition the pleas raised by the respondent were upheld and the impugned order of dismissal has been set aside. The appellant applied for a certificate but its application was rejected by the High Court; and so it moved this Court and obtained special leave; that is how this appeal has come to this Court at the instance of the appellant.

(2.) Broadly stated the respondent challenged the validity of the impugned order on three grounds. He urged that the said order was invalid as it was passed on the basis of an enquiry made by the police officers of the Hyderabad State, who were not subordinate to the Inspector-General of Police, Madhya Pradesh; according to him it was essential that an enquiry should have been held against him under the Police Act and Regulations of Madhya Pradesh after the show-cause notice was served on him; and since no such enquiry was held the whole proceedings are void and the impugned order is ultra vires. He also urged that the said order was not in accordance with Regulation No. 273 of Police Regulations of Madhya Pradesh, and the contravention of the said Regulation made the order invalid. Lastly it was argued that the enquiry held by the Hyderabad authorities was contrary to all principles of natural justice, and at the said enquiry the respondent had not been given a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges framed against him.

(3.) It appears that a previous decision of the Division Bench of the High Court in Jageram Malik v. State of Madhya Pradesh, ILR (1955) Nag 93: (AIR 1955 Nag 160), has held that a police officer deputed on duty at Hyderabad was governed by the Police Act, the Police Regulations and the General Book Circulars prevailing in Nagpur, and that an enquiry must be held by an officer exercising jurisdiction under the said Police Act and the Police Regulations. According to the said decision the proper thing to do in holding an enquiry against a police officer deputed to Hyderabad was to retransfer him to Madhya Pradesh and then hold enquiry as required by the Madhya Pradesh Police Act and Regulations. In the case of Jageram Malik, ILR (1955) Nag 93: (AIR 1955 Nag 160), the Court ultimately held that the enquiry made by an officer exercising jurisdiction in Hyderabad State could not form the basis of any action on the part of the Inspector-General of Police, Madhya Pradesh, and so the order of dismissal based on such an enquiry was set aside. It was on strength of this decision that the respondent challenged the validity of the impugned order passed against him. On this question there was a difference of opinion among the judges who constituted the Special Bench which heard the respondent's petition. Mr. Justice Sen, who was a party to the decision in Jageram Malik's case, ILR (1955) Nag 93: (AIR 1955 Nag 160), was inclined to uphold the respondent's contention, whereas Rao, J. rejected the said contention and Bhutt, J. was presumably inclined to agree with Rao, J. Similarly there was a difference of opinion among the judges on the question as to whether a breach of Police Rules and Regulations was justiciable. Sen and Bhutt, JJ. were inclined to uphold the respondent's plea, whereas Rao, J. rejected it. On the question as to whether the enquiry actually held by the appellant in Hyderabad suffered from the infirmities alleged by the respondent the learned judges were similarly divided. Sen and Bhutt, JJ. held that the enquiry in question was contrary to the principles of natural justice while Rao, J. took a contrary view.