DURGA PRASAD Vs. STATE OF MP

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Leave granted.

(2.) This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28th April, 2009, passed by Jabalpur Bench of the Madhya Pradesh High Court, dismissing Criminal Appeal No. 103 of 2000, which had been directed against the judgment of conviction and sentence under Section 498A and Section 304B Indian Penal Code. By the said judgment, the learned Sessions Judge had sentenced the Appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000/- and in default of payment of fine to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 3 months under Section 498A IPC and to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 7 years and to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default of payment of such fine, to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a further period of 3 years. Upon consideration of the materials on record, the High Court was of the view that the prosecution had proved its case beyond all reasonable doubts and that the appeal, therefore, deserved to be dismissed.

(3.) Appearing in support of the appeal, Mr. R.P. Gupta, learned Senior Advocate, contended that both the Courts below had erred in convicting the Appellants on the basis of evidence on record. Mr. Gupta submitted that in the absence of any evidence to prove the charges under Sections 304B and 498A IPC, the trial Court, as also the High Court, had erred in merely relying on the presumption available under Section 304B regarding the death of a woman by any burn or bodily injury or otherwise than under normal circumstances, within 7 years of her marriage, in coming to a conclusion that there would be a natural inference in such circumstance under Section 113A and 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, that the accused persons had caused the death of Kripa Bai by torturing her physically and mentally so as to drive the deceased to commit suicide. Mr. Gupta submitted that both the Courts below appear to have overlooked the fact that in order to prove a case of dowry death it would have to be shown that in addition to the fact that the death took place otherwise than in normal circumstances within 7 years of marriage, that soon before her death, the wife was subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry. It was pointed out by Mr. Gupta that in the explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 304B it had been mentioned that for the purpose of the said Sub-section, "dowry" shall have the same meaning as under Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.