HAR NARAIN Vs. MAM CHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These appeals have been preferred against the judgments and orders dated 9.10.2001 and 9.9.2002 passed by the High Court of Punjab & Haryana High Court at Chandigarh in R.S.A. No. 1545 of 1979 dismissing the Regular Second Appeal, as well as the Review Application, filed by the appellant concurring with the judgments and orders of the trial Court as well as of the First Appellate Court on all issues raised in the case.

(2.) Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that the defendant/respondent No. 1-Mam Chand (since deceased through LRs.) (hereinafter called the respondent) was the owner of land admeasuring 22 kanals situate within the Revenue estate of Village Asraka Majra, District Riwari, Haryana. The said respondent had mortgaged the entire land in favour of the predecessor-in-interest of the appellant, namely, Har Narain (since deceased and now represented through his LRs.) for Rs. 7,000/-. The appellant was also put in possession of the said land. The respondent No. 1entered into an Agreement for Sale of 8 kanals of the said property with the appellant for Rs. 7500/- and he received Rs. 200/- as earnest money in cash while a sum of Rs. 7000/- to be adjusted as mortgage amount. However, the said respondent No. 1 executed the sale deed on 2.8.1971 in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6.

(3.) Being aggrieved, the appellant filed Suit No. 172 of 1971, for specific performance against the respondent No. 1 for executing the sale deed of the land in question on 10.8.1971 and the trial Court restrained him from alienating the suit property by any means. Respondent No. 1 moved an application dated 16.8.1971 for vacating/modifying the interim order dated 10.8.1971 wherein he disclosed that the entire land in dispute had already been alienated in favour of respondent Nos. 2 to 6. However, the sale deed executed in favour of the said respondents was registered on 3.9.1971. The suit was contested by the respondents on various grounds, however, the trial Court dismissed the suit vide judgment and decree dated 4.9.1973 on various grounds, inter alia, that sale deed deemed to have come into force on 2.8.1971, as the registration thereof dated 3.9.1971 would relate back to the date of execution which had been prior to institution of the suit and thus, the doctrine of lis pendens would not apply. The said respondents 2 to 6 were bona fide purchasers for consideration without notice. Therefore, the sale deed in their favour was to be protected.